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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law

-

Right of Federal Trade Comm;ssion to Issue

Subpoenas in Clayton Act Proceedings.-In a proceeding to enforce section
2(d) of the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission served defendant with
a subpoena. Upon application for enforcement thereof, the court held that the
Commission has no power to issue a subpoena in a proceeding before it for the
enforcement of the Clayton Act. FTC v. Rubin, 145 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
The Federal Trade Commission Act, passed in September 1914, established
the Commission to prevent ". . . unfair methods of competition in commerce
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. . . ...It provided for
hearings to determine alleged violations of the act, a procedure to be followed
in the conduct of these hearings and judicial review of the Commission's determinations. 2 To aid in the performance of its duties the Commission was
authorized to issue subpoenas "for the purposes of sections 41-46 and 47-58 of
this title. . . .-3 and, in another section, a method was prescribed for the service
of "complaints, orders, and other processes of the Commission. .. 2"1 Less
than a month later, Congress passed the Clayton Act to supplement existing
antitrust legislation. To enforce the provisions of this act no new administrative
structure was erected but, rather, use was made of the tools at hand and jurisdiction was vested in established agencies, among them the Federal Trade Commission. 5 The Clayton Act also provided for hearings and specified a
procedure much the same as that contained in the Federal Trade Commission
Act.6 While the new act again detailed a method of service of process, no
mention was made of administrative subpoenas.
After forty years of alleged use of its subpoena power in proceedings brought
to enforce the Clayton Act, the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to
do so has finally been challenged not only in the district court of New Yorkr
but of Maryland as well.s Though the issue in both cases was identical, different results were reached. In the instant case two principal arguments were
considered which would justify the use of subpoenas in such proceedings. The
first of these was that the power to issue subpoenas was granted to all the
enforcing agencies by the terms of the Clayton Act itself. This consideration
arose out of the procedural section directing the manner in which "complaints,
orders, and other processes ' * should be served; the contention being that this
use of the word "processes" implied a grant of subpoena power. No doubt, such
1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (1951).
2. 1S U.S.C.A. § 45(b) (1951).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. § 49 (1951).
4. 15 U.S.CA. § 45(f) (1951).
5. 15 U.S.CA. § 21 (1951).
6. Ibid.
7. 145 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
s. FTC v. Menzies, 145 F. Supp. 164 (D.Md. 1956).
9. 15 U.S.CA. § 21 (1951).
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a generic word in its legal sense could include a subpoena 0 and quite probably
would if the statute referred to court proceedings."' An administrative agency,
though, limited as it is to those powers given it by statute, 12 could hardly base
its right to issue subpoenas on this alone. As noted in the principal case and
elsewhere, 13 the Federal Reserve Board, one of the agencies empowered to
enforce the Clayton Act still has no subpoena power in spite of the fact that
it too was empowered to serve complaints, orders and other processes.
The second possible authorization considered by the court was that the
Commission might use the subpoena power granted to it in the Federal Trade
Commission Act when enforcing the Clayton Act. This possibility was rejected
with less reluctance than the first but it would seem to be the far firmer basis
for argument. In fact, it was on this ground that the Maryland District Court
in FTC v. Menzies' 4 chose to affirm the Commission's action. It was there
argued that when the two acts are read together the Commission's subpoena is
recognized in the Clayton Act and may be validly exercised in the enforcement
of that act. The Maryland district court noted that a subpoena issued by the
Commission could be enforced if the complaint had charged a violation of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,' 5 or a violation of both that act and the
Clayton Act,' 6 or even if issued prior to any complaint at all. 17 Thus, it was
reasoned that the mere service of a complaint charging only a violation of the
Clayton Act did not suspend the Commission's right to issue subpoenas, especially in view of a recent Supreme Court decision in which it was said that
"in either case, the arrangement transgresses § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, since minimally that section registers violations of the Clayton and
Sherman Acts."' 8
While this argument carries some weight, there are, however, methods of
procedure open to the Commission when it charges a violation of its organic
act which are not available in a proceeding under the Clayton Act. In FTC v.
Ruberoid,'9 a petition was made for affirmance of a cease and desist order and
for a decree directing enforcement of the order. In denying the latter the
Supreme Court held that while such a decree may be had in Federal Trade
Commission Act proceedings, proof that a violation of the order is imminent is
a necessary prerequisite in a case under the Clayton Act. There is also a
different manner prescribed in each act as to how orders to cease and desist are
10. Process defined in law: "Any judicial writ or order issued at the commencement or
during the progress of an action, as summons, citation, subpoena, or execution; especially, a
writ issued to bring a defendant into court." Funk &Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary of
the English Language (1930).
11. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 374 (1877).
12. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 598 (1934).
13. Davis, Administrative Law 302 (1951).
14. 145 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1956).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 49 (1951).
16. E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
17. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953).
18. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953).
19. 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
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to become final. 20 Therefore it may be implied that in electing to proceed under
the Clayton Act the Commission must accept its limitations. As was said in the
Ruberoid case, "effective enforcement of the Clayton Act by the Commission
by the present provisions but that is a question of policy
may be handicapped
-

for Congress."'

Reading the two acts together, the court in the Menzies case stated that
while the Clayton Act specified a general procedure, it was not an attempt to
cover all the details enumerated in the organic acts of the respective enforcing
agencies, and that it would be unfair to deny to the commission the use of
subpoenas in the conduct of authorized hearings. Subsequent enactments, however, have shown that when it was the intent of congress to permit the commission to retain and use its subpoena power such intention was clearly e.xpressed.
In the Webb-Pomerene Act -2 and the Wool Products Labeling Act0 where
the commission is the sole enforcing agency, it is specifically granted all the
powers contained in the Federal Trade Commission Act. A comparable result,
if such had been desired, could have been attained by a similar provision in
the Clayton Act were it not for the diversity of powers conferred on the individual enforcing agencies by their organic acts. The procedure specified in the
Clayton Act overcomes these structural difficulties with no mention of administrative subpoenas. The only mention of subpoenas in that act refers to those
authorized in court proceedings.
Another argument considered in both cases was that the long continued use
of the subpoena in these proceedings should not be disturbed. Accepted in
Maryland, it was rejected in the principal case as insufficient in itself to justify
use of the subpoena by the Commission.
The section of the Federal Trade Commission Act dealing with subpoenas
begins with the words "for the purposes of this Act." In the Mnezies case this
was considered broad enough to include enforcement of the Clayton Act, the
court relying on other words in the section to the effect that subpoenas are
authorized in any matter under investigation. The same introductory words,
however, have been given a restrictive meaning when the subpoena power of the
Inter-state Commerce Commission was under scrutiny 2-4 and in the principal
case, this meaning was confined to the enforcement of the F.T.C.A.
Under the Menzies interpretation of the statutes involved, each enforcing
agency might use any and all provisions in its organic act in proceeding under
the Clayton Act whereas a further application of the rule in the instant case
would require that each agency use only such powers and procedure as are
specified in the Clayton Act. Greater uniformity of enforcement would be
achieved by adopting the latter position. Out of deference to the prevalent
trend of restricting the activities of administrative agencies to those expressly
authorized by Congress, the conservative approach of the principal case would
seem the more reasonable.
20. 6 Toulmin, Anti-Trust Laws 1154 (1951).
21. 343 U.S. 470, 479 (1952).
22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 65 (1951).
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 68d(a) (1951).
24. Hlarriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 419 (190S).
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Antitrust - Treble Damages - Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.Plaintiff brought action against defendant for treble damages and injunctive
relief under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act for an alleged violation of
the third clause of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, which reads: "It
shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, .. .to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices
for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor."
Imprisonment and fines are specifically provided in case of a violation of the
section. The district court dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the court
of appeals, held, affirmed. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is a criminal
provision only and therefore not the proper basis for a private action for treble
damages or injunctive relief. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 238 F.2d 86
(7th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 1023 (1957).
A cause of action for treble damages or injunctive relief for violations of the
federal antitrust laws exists only where it is specifically granted by statute.,
Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act 2 grant a private action for treble damages
and injunctive relief for violations or threatened violations of the "antitrust
laws" which have injured a plaintiff or threaten loss or damage to him. Section 1
of the Clayton Act 3 defines "antitrust laws" to mean the Sherman Act, 4 the
Wilson Tariff Act, the act amending the Wilson Tariff Act,6 and the Clayton
Act itself. 6
The majority of district courts have taken the position that private remedies
are available for a violation of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.7 The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that clauses two and three
of section 3 would support a private treble damage suit under section 4 of the
Clayton Act.8 This was the second appellate decision, decided less than a week
after the instant case, which has squarely decided this point.9 A recent Supreme
1. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26 (1951).
3. Id. § 12.
4. Id. §§ 1-7.
5. Id. §§ 8-11.
6. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 238 F.2d 86, 88 (7th Cir. 1956).
7. Dean Oil Co. v. American Oil Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1957 Trade Cas.) 5 68593,
at 72390 (D.N.J. 1956); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.
Cal. 1950); Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1951 Trade Cas.) V 62859,
at 64536 (NJ). Ill.
1951) ; Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 673 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.C. Conn. 1950); A. J. Goodman & Son, Inc.
v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D.C. Mass. 1949); Atlanta Brick Co. v.
O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. Tex. 1942).
8. Vance v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 239 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 1023
(1957). Cf. Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1957 Trade Cas.) U 68635,
at 72558 (10th Cir. 1957). The district court decision in the Vance case, 137 F. Supp. 841
(D.N.M. 1956), which was reversed, is the basis for the present decision.
9. However, there is a companion decision to the instant case, handed down on the same
day, which held that section 3 would not support a private action for treble damages.
Mackay v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1956).
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Court decision assumed in dictum' 0 that section 3 is a privately enforceable
antitrust law.' These results are based upon an interpretation of the legislative

history of the act which includes section 3 as an amendment to section 2 of
the Clayton Act along with section 2,1' or upon the belief that any law which
deals with antitrust matters is an "antitrust law" within the meaning of sections
4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.' 3 The instant decision disregarded the weight of
authority favoring the reasoning of the minority of the district courts 4 that
the legislative history of the act indicates that a private right of action does not
exist under section 3 since it is not an amendment to the "antitrust laws" as
defined in section 1 of the Clayton Act.15
The Robinson-Patman Bill,'0 containing the substance of section 2 of the
act as passed, was introduced in Congress as an amendment to section 2 of the
Clayton Act.17 Some months later, the Borah-Van Nuys Bill,'8 which later
became section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, was introduced in the Senate 0
as a criminal statute to amend section 2 of the Clayton Act?*o Later, it was

attached to the Robinson Bill in the Senate - ' and both bills were passed in that
10. Report of the Attorney Generals National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws

2GO n.227 (1955).
11. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 343 U.S. 115 (1954). Also, Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 750 (1946).
12. 80 Cong. Rec. 9414-15 (1936), and the congressional debates on this particular problem. Id. at 9420-21, 9903.
13. Vance v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 239 F.2d 144, 146 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Spencer v. Sun Oil
Co., 94 F. Supp. 403, 410 (D.C. Conn. 1950). Legislation, in order to be the bas for a
treble damage suit or injunctive relief under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, must be an
amendment to one of the "antitrust laws" enumerated in § 1 of the Clayton Act, and
not merely an act which affects the antitrust laws in general. In the Balian Ice Cream case,
see note 7 supra, the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act was deemed inconclusive
as to whether § 3 was an amendment to the Clayton Act, but since the "aim of the
statute" or purpose was to affect antitrust matters it was held to amend the Clayton AcL
14. National Used Car Market Report, Inc. v. National Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 103
F. Supp. 692, 694 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See Hershel Cal. Fruit
Products Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 603, 606-07 (NJ). Cal. 1954). It has been
suggested that treble damages may not even be recovered under § 2 of the RobinsonPatman Act. McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of Strict
Construction, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 410, 419 (1937).
However, it is submitted that compensatory damages may be recovered by a plaintiff who
is injured by a violation of § 3 because it is the violation of a criminal statute. See Fairport,
P. & E.R.R. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1934); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rig-by, 241 U.S.
33, 39 (1916); Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mascs. 1949).
15. 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
16. S. 3154, H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). For a discu-sion of some of the
competitive practices which led to the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, see Legis. Note,
Robinson-Patman Bill, 24 Geo. L.J. 951-55 (1936).
17. S. 3154, H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
18. S. 4171, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
19. Ibid.
20. Legis. Note, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 306, 312 (1936).
21. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
198 (1955).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

form. The wording of the Borah-Van Nuys Bill was taken almost verbatim
from a Canadian criminal statute, 22 and its provisions remained unchanged
when it was enacted as section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.23 After the
passage of the Patman Bill in the House, which did not include the Borah-Van
Nuys Bill, both bills went to a conference committee. The conference committee
reported a revised draft which incorporated the Borah-Van Nuys measure as
section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Bill.2 4 The conference committee report 2 "
the first section of the bill was intended as an amendment
indicates that only 26
to the Clayton Act.
The debates in both the House and Senate prior to the adoption of the act,
while not absolutely clear, do indicate that the members believed that private
rights of action for treble damages and injunctive relief did not exist under
section 3 and it was not an amendment to the Clayton Act.27 The ambiguity
which exists in the debates has been attributed to the fact that this legislation
was passed under the pressure of an organized lobby 28 and it was not given
sufficient consideration.2 9 Congress did not make clear what effect it thought
particular sections of the act would have in particular situations. 0 In 1950,
Representative Patman, co-author of the act, clearly indicated that section
3 was not a part of the Clayton Act or the "antitrust laws." He said: " .
[S]ection 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act has never been added to the list of
laws designated as 'antitrust laws' in section 1 of the Clayton Act. . . . [T]he
House did not put section 3 in that act, it was put in in the Senate, Senator
22. Canada Stat., 25 & 26 Geo. V, c. 56, § 9 (1935), amending § 598A of the Criminal
Code. "See Legis. Notes, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106, 119 (1936); 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 306, 308 (1936).
For a prediction that a statute similar to the Canadian statute would be unconstitutional in
the United States, see McAllister, Government and Some Problems of the Market Place, 21
Iowa L. Rev. 305, 317 n.22 (1936). Since the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, many
have expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of § 3 because it is felt that the term "unreasonably low prices" as used in clause three does not set a sufficiently clear standard of
criminality. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 201 (1955) ("Doubts besetting section 3's constitutionality seem well founded. ....");
United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 89 F. Supp. 112 (NJ). Il. 1949); 9 N.Y.U. Intra. L.
Rev. 239, 242-44 (1954). Contra, F & A Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F. Supp. 180
(S.D. Cal. 1951); Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co., CCH 1950-51 Trade Cases, i 62859 (N.D.
il.1951).
23. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 238 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1956).
24. 80 Cong. Rec. 9414 (1936).
25. H.R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
26. 80 Cong. Rec. 9414-15 (1936).
27. See the statements by Representatives Utterback, Boileau, Celler, Hancock, Massingale,
and Miller, and by Senators Van Nuys and Vandenburg. 80 Cong. Rec. 9420-21, 9903 (1936).
28. Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 23 Va. L. Rev. 140, 143-44 (1936).
29. McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of Strict tonstruction, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 410, 413 (1937); Legis. Note, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106, 119
(1936).
30. For example, it is not at all clear whether the defenses available in an action under
§ 2 of the act are available in a prosecution under § 3. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 199 (1955).
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Borah and Senator Van Nuys were the authors, it was put in in conferences, to
get a bill, we agreed for it to stay in. Since that time section 3 has not been
carried as part of the antitrust laws."'31
The form of the Robinson-Patman Act itself indicates that section 3 is not
an amendment to the Clayton Act. 32 First, the general heading which precedes
the Robinson-Patman Act reads: "To amend section 2 of the [Clayton] Act
.. . and for other purposes."33 Second, the heading immediately preceding
section 2 reads: "That section 2 of the [Clayton] Act . . . is amended to
read as follows . . . . " Section 2, subdivisions (a) through (f), then appears
enclosed in quotation marks. The remainder of the act, including section 3, is
not included in quotation marks. 35 Thus, the portions of the act not enclosed in
the quotation marks do not amend the Clayton Act, but are "for other purposes"
as stated in the general introduction.
The inclusion, by the codifiers, of the section in Title 15 of the United
States Code, which is only prima facie evidence of the law,20 as section 13a
renders it an "antitrust law" because it is enumerated as such in section 12 of
the same title. However, this was an erroneous enumeration of section 13a in
section 12, which is the codification of section I of the Clayton Act, and it is
at Large prevail over the United States Code when they
clear that the Statutes
37
are inconsistent.
Most non-judicial authorities have, almost unanimously, taken the position
that a civil remedy for treble damages and injunctive relief does not exist under
section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.3s The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws stated the same position in rather strong
terms: "We believe that acceptance of section 3 as a basis for private treble
damage litigation involves highly dubious statutory construction and, more
important, finds support neither in the legislative intent nor overall antitrust
policy. Hence, at the least, any authority to enforce section 3 should be
restricted to responsible officials of the United States."
31. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 7905,
S1st Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 14, pt.6, at 46 (1950).
32. Nashville Mlk Co. v. Carnation Co, 233 F.2d 86, S9 (1956).
33. 49 Stat. 1528 (1936). (Emphasis added.)
34. Ibid.
35.

Ibid.

36. 1 U.S.C.A. p. 4 (1927).
37. Stephen v. United States, 319 US. 423, 426 (1942).
38. Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act-The Meaning of Sections 1 and
3,-22 A.B.A.J. 593, 649 (1936); Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 23 Va. L. Rev.
140, 146 (1936); McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-Patman Act: Possdbilities of
Strict Construction, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 410, 419 (1937); RaN, Antitrust Policy in Distribution, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 185, 217 (1955); Dillon, Criminal Penalties, Section 3 of Robinson-Patman Act, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Record of April Mecting, 1956, at 114-19;
Legis. Notes, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106, 121-22 (1936); 35 U. Pa. L. Rev. 305, 312 (1937);
Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 285, 293-94 (1954). Contra, 9 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 239, 240-41
(1954); Comment, 31 N.C.L. Rev. 454,456-57 (1953).
39. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
201 (1955). It is suggested that § 3 be repealed "as dangerous surplussage." Ibid.
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To allow a suit for treble damages and injunctive relief for a breach of
section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act would lead to an incongruous result.
Section 3 is broader in its application to business transactions than is section
2.40 If section 3 supports private actions under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
2 is rendered superfluous.
Act along with its own criminal sanctions, section
41
Such a result could hardly have been intended.
Eminent Domain - Compensation for Neighboring Landowners for Taking
of Land for Use Inconsistent with Restrictive Covenant for Their Benefit.Sanitation district, after failure to agree with the owner of a twenty-one acre
tract of land as to the value thereof, instituted condemnation proceedings.
Thirty-seven days prior to the bringing of the proceedings and while negotiations
as to the value of the tract were in progress, the landowner, the plaintiffs and
thirty-seven other persons claiming to own land within an eleven square
mile area adjacent to the land in question, executed and recorded a restrictive
use agreement which attempted to prohibit the use of their respective properties
for certain purposes, including a sanitary disposal system. Following the commencement of the condemnation action a cross-petition was presented to the
trial court on behalf of plaintiffs and others, asking to intervene and demanding damages because of the proposed taking of the land for a disposal system.
After a hearing, the application to intervene was denied. Upon appeal, held,
affirmed. To award damages for each interest in a large area subject to deed
restrictions or restrictive covenants for the taking of a part thereof through
condemnation proceedings for use inconsistent with the restrictions thereon
would be contrary to public policy, tending to defeat the right of eminent
domain. Smith v. Clifton Sanitation Dist., Colo. , 300 P.2d 584 (1956).
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation.' The several
states, as sovereign entities, also enjoy the right of eminent domain. But the
states have also been held under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution
to provide just compensation for property taken in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, 2 and at present all but three of the state constitutions contain
substantially identical, in this regard, to that of the fifth
express provisions
3
amendment.
40. Id. at 198, 199; Comment, 31 N.C.L. Rev. 454 (1953); see note 25 supra.
41. But see Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act: The Meaning of Sections
1 and 3, 22 A.B.A.J. 593, 600 (1936).

1. U.S. Const. amend. V, § 1. The last sentence of the section states:

". .

.nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
2. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). "In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private property Is taken
for the State or under its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to
the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by tie
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States ...."
3. See 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain §§ 15-61 (3d ed. 1909), in which these provisions are
collected.
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Although it is clear that the owner of land taken for public use by any political subdivision or agency through the exercise of the right of eminent domain
is entitled to the just value of such land, there is a division of authority as to
whether neighboring landowners who are beneficiaries of deed restrictions or
restrictive covenants limiting the use of the land taken, are entitled to compensation when the land is to be put to a use inconsistent with the restrictions
upon it.
The majority of jurisdictions hold that neighboring landowner beneficiaries
are entitled to compensation for the loss of a property right. " This position has
been adopted by the Restatemen 5 and is recognized as such by legal writers.0

The minority refuses to compensate neighboring landowner beneficiaries when
land under restriction is taken for an inconsistent public use, and is based on

one, or, more usually, both of two theories: that the restrictions rest upon
contract and therefore do not create such property interests for which compen-

sation must be paid, and that such building restrictions are void as against
public policy in so far as they interfere with a governmental function. In

Anderson v. Lynch7 and Friesen v. Glendale,s the courts' refusals to compensate
made use of both theories but emphasized that of contract. On the other band

Doan v. Clevelanda and Houston v. Wynn,10 while also using both theories,
4. In the leading case of Stamford v. Vuono, 103 Conn. 359, 143 At. 245 (1923), defendant, a grantor who exacted covenants from her grantees for the benefit and protection of
her adjoining land which she retained, was held to be entitled to compensation when a
governmental agency took land from her grantees for public use violative of the covenants.
In Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 5S, 24 N.E. SSS (IS90), the owners of adjoining lots entered
into mutual covenants of easement of light and air restricting the height of buildings to be
built thereon. When a portion was taken for a courthouse free of the easements, the owners
of the remaining land were held to be entitled to compensation. New York, in Flynn v. New
York, W. & B. Ry., 21S N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916), applied the majority rule. Defendant
railroad company argued that the restrictive covenants in question, in so far as they prohibited
the construction and operation of a railroad, were void as against public policy. However
the New York Court of Appeals adopted the language of the earlier case of Columbia College
v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440, 446 (1377), and held that building restrictions have never been regarded as impolitic and that it follows that they cannot be taken and destroyed without just
compensation. The majority view was recently reaffirmed in Meagher v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 195 Va. 133, 77 S.E.2d 461 (1953).
5. Restatement, Property § 566 (1944): "Upon condemnation of land subject to the
obligation of a promise respecting its use in such manner as to extinguish the interest in the
land created by the promise, compensation must be made to those entitled to the benefit of
the promise."
6. E.g. 1 Lewis, op. cit. supra note 3, § 224: "When property subject to a restrictive
covenant is taken for public use, the owner of the property for whose benefit the retriction
is imposed, is entitled to compensation." See also 2 American Law of Property § 9.40 (Casner
ed. 1952) and 5 Powell, Real Property U 6S6 (1956).
7. 1S Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 8 (1939).
3. 209 Cal. 524, 28 Pac. lOS0 (1930).
9. 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 (1915).
10. 279 S.W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App.), writ of error refused, 115 Tax. 255, 231 S.W. 544
(1926).
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gave greater weight to the public policy argument. United States v. Certain
Lands" is often cited in support of both the contract and public policy arguments but that case turned upon a finding by the court that the use intended to
be made of the property did not in fact violate the provisions as to use in the
deeds. 12 In a number of minority cases there is the added factor of reluctance
of the court to increase the costliness of public use.' 3 In Anderson, the damages
asked by the five plaintiffs totaled $37,500, and there was evidence that some
two hundred others awaited the outcome of the case.
The majority view appears to be the better one. Clearly equitable servitudes
and restrictive covenants running with the land give to the dominant tenant a
property right of marketable value.' 4 To deny compensation merely because
the rights arise out of contract has been described as too unconscionable to be
supported in law.
The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public
use is a restriction upon the right of eminent domain imposed by the Constitution. Therefore, it would seem logical that compensation be given for the
destruction of property rights arising from use restrictions running with the
land.
The instant case was one of first impression in Colorado. The situation presented to the court was extreme. The plaintiffs entered into the restrictive use
agreements a mere thirty-seven days prior to the bringing of the condemnation
proceedings in what was an obvious'5 attempt to frustrate the plans of the
sanitation district by making the cost prohibitive. Faced with such transparent
bad faith and with the prospect of opening the door to many more claims, 10
the court made use of both the contract and public policy theories and in
denying the plaintiff's petition, adopted the minority rule.
Clearly the instant case, because of bad faith element, could have been
distinguished upon its facts and compensation denied as an improper restriction
upon the right of eminent domain consistent with the majority view. It is
submitted that such would have been the preferable course rather than to have
adopted the minority rule which, because it denies compensation to both good
and bad faith claimants alike, renders the cure more damaging than the disease.
11. 112 Fed. 622 (C.C.R.I. 1899), aff'd sub nom., Wharton v. United States, 153 Fed.
876 (1st Cir. 1907).
12. Id. at 877: "The purpose of the United States in acquiring the property does not
appear to be in any substantial particular inconsistent with the conditions of the deeds or
destructive thereof."
13. E.g., Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85 (1939) and Friesen v. Glendale, 209
Cal. 524, 288 Pac. 1080 (1930).
14. Interesting is the comment of the court in Long Eaton Recreational Grounds Co.
v. Midland Ry., [1902] 2 K.B. 574, 586: "There is in this case a negative easement adding

to the monetary value of the estate. Why that should not be the subject of compensation
it is difficult to conceive."
Colo.
, 300 P.2d 548, 549 (1956) "It
15. Smith v. Clifton Sanitation District,
requires no imagination to determine why the restrictive covenants were executed and
recorded on the eve of the filing of the condemnation case."
16. Ibid. "... [Iif they be allowed to intervene countless others would be entitled to come
in and claim damages."
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Libel -

Damages

-

Admissibility of party's religious beliefs.-

During a primary election contest, defendants published a campaign newspaper
in which plaintiffs were accused of Communist affiliations. In a subsequent
action for libel, defendants conceded that plaintiffs were not Communists. At
the trial, plaintiffs offered a substantial amount of evidence concerning their
religious faith and observances. This was admitted, over defendants' objections
of prejudice and irrelevance, upon the question of damages. A verdict and
judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed by the appellate division. On appeal, held,
three judges dissenting, affirmed. Evidence of religious belief is admissible on
the issue of damages, in the discretion of the trial court, to show the circumstances surrounding the libel. Toomey v. Farley, 2 N.Y.2d 71, 138 N.E.2d 221
(1956).
As a general rule, reference to the race, religion or nationality of a party or
witness is inadmissible because of irrelevance and the possible prejudicial effect
on the jury, and constitutes reversible error.'
Usually, where such remarks are made, a withdrawal of them, an admonition
by the court, or an instruction to the jury to disregard them will be sufficient
to avoid a reversal. 2 In some few instances, however, the references may be
so flagrant as to require 3reversal even where the trial court has done all it could
to minimize their effect.
As the court pointed out, the instant case is clearly distinguishable from the
decisions announcing the general rule. In those cases, the question of religion
could have had no possible bearing on the issues involved, and was interjected
solely as an appeal to prejudice. An exception to the general rule will be made,
however, where the circumstances justify the reference.
The evidence here undoubtedly would have been competent had the issue
of Communism been raised. In view of the well known opposition of all recognized religions in this country to Communism, evidence that plaintiff actively
practiced his religion would be relevant to the question of whether he was a
Communist.
In a libel action, it has been held to be competent to"... show the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff, and as bearing upon the hurtful
tendency of
4
the libel, and the general damage to which he was exposed."
As the court pointed out, a charge of communist affiliations directed at one
1. MAalinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 433-34 (1945); Skuy v. United States, 261 Fed.
316 (8th Cir. 1919); People v. Castellano, 273 App. Div. 973, 73 N.Y.S2d 356 (2d Dep'L
1948); Saunders v. Champlain Bus Corp., 263 App. Div. 63, 34 N.Y.S.2d 447 (3d Dep't
1942); Abbate v. Solan, 257 App. Div. 776, 15 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't 1939); Bowen
v. Mahoney Coal Corp., 256 App. Div. 435, 10 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1st Dep't 1939); Schotis
v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 163 Wash. 305, 1 P.2d 221 (1931); Ogodzili v. Cara, 173
Wis. 371, 181 N.W. 227 (1921).
2. United States v. Heitler, 274 Fed. 401 (N.D. Ill.
1921).
3. Watts v. Espy, 211 Ala. 502, 101 So. 106 (1924); People v. Newman , 113 Cal. App.
679, 293 Pac. 1044 (1931).
4. Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N.Y. 207, 210, 25 N.E. 161, 162 (IS90); Bishop
v. New York Times Co., 233 N.Y. 446, 135 N.E. 845 (1922). See aho Sweeny v. Schenectady
Union Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288, aff'd, 316 U.S. 642 (1941).
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actively participating in the affairs of his church would result in more serious
harm than if directed at one not so engaged. Not only would he be subject to
contempt and scorn upon the issue of Communism alone, but also he would
necessarily be regarded as a hypocrite. Hence, this type of evidence should be
admitted, in the discretion of the trial court, under this rule, as having a bearing
on the issue of damages. The court, although conceding that such detailed proof
may have been distasteful, held that its admission was not such an abuse of
discretion as to require reversal.
The dissent, agreeing with the rule of the majority on this point, contended,
however, that in this instance, a mere showing of church membership would
have been sufficient, and the evidence introduced went so far beyond what was
required as to substantially prejudice the defendants.
It is submitted that this evidence should not be limited to a bare showing of
church membership, since one more active in church affairs would suffer more
harm by such a defamatory statement than a merely passive member. There is,
however, the very real danger that such evidence would tend to excite the
sympathy of the jury. For this reason, evidence of religious practices, when
admissible under the rule of this case, should be subject to strict control by the
trial court, and any proof which would go beyond what is reasonably required
should be excluded.
Evidence - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination - Denaturalization Proceedings.-Defendant became a naturalized citizen in 1925. In 1952 the
federal government instituted proceedings to cancel his naturalization on the
grounds of illegality and fraud in its procurement. At the trial government
counsel sought to compel the defendant to testify. Defendant objected on the
ground that under the fifth amendment he could not be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Held, objection overruled. United States v. Costello,
144 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
person ". . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . ."' A literal interpretation of this clause would seem to grant the
privilege only to persons testifying in a criminal proceeding, but the courts
have extended the privilege to civil actions where the testimony might subject
the witness to subsequent criminal prosecution, 2 or to a penalty or forfeiture
imposed as a punishment. 3 Similar testimony before grand juries4 and extrajudicial bodies such as legislative investigating committeesu is also privileged.
In the instant case the court held that the defendant could not avail himself
of the privilege in a denaturalization proceeding. However, the holding does
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2257 (3d ed. 1940).
3. 8 id. §§ 2256, 2257.

4. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159

(1950).
5. United States v. Pechart, 103 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1952) ; United States v. Cohen,
101 F. Supp. 906 (ND. Cal. 1952); United States v. Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191 (D.D.C. 1951).
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not faithfully mirror the mind of the court. The court suggested that denaturalization was in the nature of a penalty and that defendant should not be forced
to testify. Faced, however, with a dearth of authoritative precedent, the court
chose to make the defendant testify, so that ".... the Appellate Court with a
complete record . . . may, if it is so advised, afford the defendant ample protection by appropriate judgment."0 The court, in effect, requested that its
holding be reversed.
Procedurally, at least, a denaturalization proceeding's resemblance to a
criminal proceeding begins and ends with the fact that it is instituted in the
T
name of the United States. The suit is brought in a court of equity. The
defendant is not subject to arrest or imprisonment, and is served just as in any
other civil action. He is not entitled to a jury trial,8 and the criminal statute of
limitations does not apply.0 In a civil action the defendant can invohe the
privilege for one of two reasons: one, that the testimony would subject him to
subsequent criminal prosecution, or two, that it would subject him to a penalty
or forfeiture in the action itself. The defendant in this case had already sought
to invoke the privilege at a pre-trial hearing, and the United States Court of
Appeals found no basis to conclude that his testimony would subject him to
subsequent criminal prosecution. 10 The present issue-whether it would subject
defendant to a penalty or forfeiture in the action itself-was not briefed and
was not squarely determined in that decision. The present court maintained
that defendant was being subjected to a penalty, citing the court of appeals
loss of
decision in United States v. Minker1" for the proposition that "...
12
citizenship is a far graver penalty than most fines and many prison sentences."
3
Naturalization of an alien is not a right but a privilege. In Johannessen: v.
United States14 the Supreme Court declared: "An alien has no moral nor constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship if, by false evidence or
the like, an imposition has been practiced upon the court, without which the
0
certificate of citizenship could not and would not have been issued."' The
0
Constitution authorizes Congress to establish a uniform rule of naturalization,
and under that broad power Congress may legislate to admit or exclude aliens
as it sees fit. Congress has clearly indicated that a fraudulently obtained citizenship may be declared void ab initio, the statute providing that ".... such
revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship
6. 144 F. Supp. at 782.
7. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 671 (1946); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S.

9, 27 (1913).
3.
9.
10.
11.
12.

United States v. Mlansour, 170 Fed. 671 (S.DN.Y. 190S), afi'd, 226 U.S. 604 (1912).
Sourino v. United States, 36 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1936).
United States v. Costello, 222 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1955).
217 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1954).
Id. at 353 (dictum).

13. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S.
472 (1917).
14. 225 U.S. 227 (1912).

15. Id. at 241.
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, d. 4.
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and such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the
original date of the order and certificate, respectively ....,,17
Since naturalization is not a matter of right, and since citizenship fraudulently
obtained is void ab initio, it follows that the cancellation of that fraudulently
obtained citizenship is not a penalty or punishment. The defendant is merely
being returned to the status which he occupied before he perpetrated the fraud.
The Supreme Court has said that denaturalization ". . . imposes no penalties,
and at most provides for the annulment, by appropriate judicial proceedings, of
merely colorable letters of citizenship, to which their possessors never were
lawfully entitled."' 8
To support its contention that denaturalization imposed a penalty, the court
in the present case noted that Supreme Court decisions, such as Schneiderman
v. United States,19 required that the Government prove a denaturalization case
by "the clearest sort of justification and proof," approximating that required
in criminal cases. This argument is considerably weakened by the fact that
denaturalization is not the only type of civil action requiring such a high degree
of proof. It is regularly required in cases where cancellation for fraud is sought.
Indeed, the Court in the Schneiderman case gleaned its rule from an earlier
Supreme Court case involving the cancellation of a fraudulently obtained patent
for public land.20 The Court in the latter case had stated the general rule that
".... when in a court of equity it is proposed . ..to annul .. .a written
instrument for fraud ... the testimony on which this is done must be clear,
unequivocal, and convincing....
The court in the present case was also swayed by the fact that a denaturalization judgment may be more serious in its consequences . . . than a taking of
one's property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty."2 2 Once the
defendant's citizenship is voided, he may become liable to deportation as an
undersirable alien. However, every adverse judgment in a civil action works
to a defendant's detriment to some degree. If the effect of the judgment were
to be the determining factor, every action now classified as civil would be
potentially penal. Rather, the purpose for which the proceeding is brought
should be the criterion for determining whether it is criminal or civil in nature.
The present court also cited with approval Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion in United States v. Minker.2 3 The issue in that case was whether
Congress by statute2 4 had empowered an immigration officer to subpoena a
witness to testify against himself in an investigation to determine if good cause
existed for the institution of denaturalization proceedings. The Court held
17.

8 U.S.C.A. § 1451(a)

(Supp. 1956). (Emphasis added.)

18. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 24 (1913). (Emphasis added.)
19. 320 U.S. 118 (1943); accord, Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949);
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
20. Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325 (1887).
21. Id. at 381; accord, United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 300 (1888).
See also 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940).
22. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
23. 350 U.S. 179, 196 (1956).
24. 8 U.S.CA. § 1225(a) (1951).
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that the statute contained no such grant of power, but Justice Douglas further
argued that such a proceeding also violated constitutional guarantees, since
the Government is required "... to proceed with meticulous regard for the
basic notions of Due Process which protect every vital right of the American
citizen." 2 5 However, Justice Douglas made it clear that he was referring only
to this extra-judicial proceeding which had not received the sanction of Congress, and not to the regular denaturalization proceeding, where the _afeguards
2'
of a judicial proceeding are fully provided for by congressional enactment
A denaturalization judgment does not take away citizenship as a punishment. Rather, it declares that defendant never had citizenship. Professor
Wigmore has phrased the distinction thus: "When the penalty lies in the
yielding up of a privilege, a distinction therefore seems proper between inflicting
a punishment and restraining the continued improper exercise of functions." The present court does not agree.

Labor Law - When Economic Strikes Are Permissible Under Section
8(d) (4) of the Labor-Management Relations Act.-The Union and the
Company entered into a collective bargaining contract which provided for
termination of the contract after October 23, 1951, (1) by either party giving
notice not earlier than August 24, 1951, of the desire to modify the contract;
and (2) if no agreement were reached during the sixty days following such
notice, the contract could be terminated sixty days after a second notice was
given stating the effective date of termination. Pursuant to notice by the Union
on August 24, 1951, negotiations for modification began and continued unsuccessfully until April 30, 1952, when the Union went on strike. Certain actions
of the Company during the strike were charged as unfair labor practices. The
Company's defense was that the strike, because it occurred while the contract
was still in effect, was a violation of section 8(d) (4) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, and, therefore, the Union lost the protection of section 8. The
NLRB denied the Company's defense and found for the Union. The court of
appeals denied enforcement holding that the strike, because it was prior to the
termination of the contract, was violative of the section. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, two justices dissenting in part and one
justice not participating, reversed. Where a contract provides for reopening, the
statute does not prohibit a strike once the statutory sixty-day period has
passed. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
Section 8 of the Labor-Management Relations Act prohibits certain specified
unfair labor practices.1 Subsection (d) defines the duty established in section
8 (b) (3)2 to bargain collectively and provides the procedure whereby an existing
25. 350 U.S. at 197.
26. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1451 (1951).
27. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2257 (3d ed. 1940).
1. 29 U.S.CA. § 153 (1956).

2. 29 U.S.C-L § 15S(b) (3) (1956).
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collective bargaining agreement may be terminated or modified.8 Under paragraph (4) of section 8(d) a contract may be terminated or modified if the
party desiring to do so, ". . continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract
for a period of sixty days after such notice [the notice in paragraph (1)] is
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs
later. . .. -4 Because of its ambiguous wording and the paucity of light which
legislative history sheds upon its meaning, this paragraph has presented difficulties of interpretation since its enactment. 5 These difficulties have been
especially pronounced when the contract contained a reopening provision.(
Originally the question presented to the courts under section 8(d)(4) was:
Where there is a collective bargaining contract in existence which will terminate
at a time specified in the contract, does a strike7 pursuant to the sixty-day
statutory notice s but prior to the terminal date of the contract violate the
3.

"...

[WIhere there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract . . . the duty to bargain

collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such
contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification"(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains
no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or
modification;
"(2)..
"(3) . . .

"(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice
is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later:
1... the duties so imposed [in paragraph (1)] shall not be construed as requiring either
party to discuss or agree to any modification of . . .a contract for a fixed period, if such
modification is to become effective before such [contract] . .. can be reopened under the
provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day
period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee. . . ." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(d) (1956).
4. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (4) (1956).
5. These difficulties have been recognized by all of the cited cases. See S. Rep. No. 968,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1948) for a discussion of the reasons why an amendment to the
subsection was deemed necessary by the joint-Committee on Labor-Management Relations.
6. Where there is a fixed term contract which does not contain a reopening provision,
a strike prior to the end of the contract, even if pursuant to sixty days notice, is not
allowed by § 8(d) (4) but may be such a breach of contract to subject the union to an action
for damages or to preclude it from protection under the LMRA. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939), discussed in the instant case at 293; see the discussion of the
concurring opinion of justice Frankfurter in the text, infra.
7. The term "strike" as used in this note means "economic strike", i.e., a strike "with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." See 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(d) (1956), the definition of collective bargaining.
8. "... It should be noted that [§ 8(d)] does not render inoperative the obligation to
conform to notice provisions for longer periods, if the collective agreement so provides.
Failure to give such notice, however, does not become an unfair labor practice if the 60-day
provision is complied with. . . ." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947).
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the NLRB took the position that a strike
section? In the first Wilson
after statutory notice had been given was not violative of section 8(d)(4),
where the contract contained an express terminal date but did not provide
for reopening. The NLRB's decision noted that a literal interpretation of
paragraph (4) would go beyond the fundamental purpose of the subsection,
viz., to forestall strikes without warning and provide a cooling-off period for
labor and management to discuss their differences, by unnecessarily prolonging
the suspension of the right to strike.'0
In the second Wilson case," which arose out of the same national strike, the
Board reiterated its position in a situation where the strike occurred approximately ninety days after notice of the desire to modify the terms of employment
but prior to the express terminal date in the contract. The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit rejected this position and held that if a strike occurs
prior to an express terminal date section 8(d) (4) is violated despite sixty-day
notice by the union.'- This view was based on a literal interpretation of the
"whichever
is later" clause of paragraph (4)13 and has been reviewed in legal
14
writings.
The instant case concerned the legality of a strike occurring after the statutory period where the contract contained a reopening provision. A newly constituted Board adjudicated the principal case in the first instance and acquiesced
in the Eighth Circuit's view that if the contract expresses a terminal date, a
strike prior to that date, though after the statutory period, was violative of the
section. 15 However, the Board distinguished the facts of the instant case from
the second Wilson case, stating that "the term 'expiration date' as used in
section 8(d) (4) . ..has a twofold meaning; it connotes not only the terminal

date of a bargaining contract, but also an agreed date in the course of its
existence when the parties can effect changes in its provisions."' 0 This position
was rejected by the Eighth Circuit which applied its reasoning in the second
Wilson case, and held that the section, when taken literally, prohibits strikes
which in fact precede the terminal date of a collective bargaining agreement,
whether the date is expressed in the contract or is to be determined by a method
of notice as provided for in the contract in the instant case.' 7
The Supreme Court, by adopting the NLRB's interpretation of section
8(d) (4), has produced a result which in effect conforms to the basic policy of
the Taft-Hartley Act and provides a reasonable construction of section
8(d) (4).11 In accepting the Board's view the Court stressed the eminently
9. Wilson & Co, 89 N.L.R.B. 310 (1950).

10. Ibid.
11. Local 3, United Packinghouse Workers, 105 N.L.R.B. 823 (1953).
12. Local 3, United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert denied,
348 U.S. 822 (1954).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. See Notes, 44 Geo. LJ. 447-60 (1956) ; 64 Yale L.J. 24S-59 (1954).
15. Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 6S0 (1954).
16. Id at 683.
17. Lion Oil Co. v. NLRIB, 221 F.2d 231 (Sth Cir. 1955).
18. 352 U.S. 289 (1957).
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practical need for interpreting contracts containing reopening provisions in the
light of the fundamental purposes of the Taft-Hartley Act, viz., "to substitute
collective bargaining for economic warfare and to protect the right of employees
to engage in concerted activities for their own benefits."' 9 Turning to the
section the Court noted that it was significant that three different terms,
"termination," "modification," and "expiration," were used in the various paragraphs. The Court further pointed out that normally notice to modify pursuant to contractual provision or to terminate where the contract by its terms
provided for such would precede the terminal date. From this the Court concluded that the term "expiration date" in paragraph (1) included both termination and modification and consequently the term as used in paragraph (4) must
of necessity have the same meaning. 20 From the language in the penultimate
sentence 2 ' following paragraph (4), the Court concluded that: ". . . Congress
recognized a duty to bargain over modifications when the contract itself contemplates such bargaining. It would be anomalous for Congress to recognize
,,2
such a duty and at the same time deprive the union of the strike threat ....
In adopting the approach of the NLRB the Supreme Court has implicitly
held, that where a termination date is expressed in a contract which does not
contain a reopening provision, a strike after the statutory cooling-off period
but prior to the termination date is an unfair labor practice. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion explicitly rejects the position of the NLRB in the first
Wilson case. Two grounds for rejecting the original interpretation of the NLRB
are set forth in the concurring opinion. The first ground is based upon an
interpolative reading of the section. The concurring opinion concluded that
the better view of the "whichever is later" clause of paragraph (4) is that it
prohibits strikes regardless of statutory notice where the contract does not
contain a reopening provision.2 3 It may be argued that the paragraph means
that, should notice be given less than sixty days before the contract is to end,
the no-strike period is to extend beyond the termination date.24 The concurring opinion admitted that this interpretation, which was essentially the
NLRB's original position,2 5 is given support by the provision in the subsection
which imposes the loss of status sanction on employees who strike within the
sixty-day period. However, the concurring opinion dismissed that contention
by suggesting that the language imposing loss of status "to be effective under
the present Board's construction

. .

. must be understood as reading 'the

19. Id. at 289.
20. Id. at 290.
21.
22.

See note 3 supra.
352 U.S. at 291.

23. Id. at 302 (concurring opinion).
24. "... . If [the statutory] notice is given, the bill provides for no waiting period except
during the life of the contract itself. If, however, either party neglects to give such notice
and waits, let us say, until 30 days before the end of the contract to give the notice, then
there is a waiting period provided during which the strike is an unlawful labor practice for
60 days from that time, or to the end of the contract and 30 days beyond that time."
Senator Taft, 93 Cong. Rec. 3955 (1947).

25. See Wilson & Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 310 (1950).
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period specified in paragraph (4).' "2G It is submitted that this is a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.
The second ground for rejecting the old Board's view is based upon a consideration of the contemporaneous and subsequent legislative history of section
8(d) (4). In accord with the cited cases and legal writings,2 7 the concurring
opinion acknowledged that the congressional reports preceding the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act indicate that the problem of strikes after the sixty-day
notice but prior to termination of a contract was not anticipated.2S The concurring qpinion suggested that the subsequent legislative history shows that
Congress after the passage of the act was in accord with the present NLRB
interpretation.2 It is submitted that legislative retrospection was properly
utilized in order to arrive at a reasonable construction of the statute.
A correct result was achieved in the instant case. The error of the court of
appeals in condemning a strike pursuant to a reopening provision and in compliance with statutory notice but prior to termination of the collective bargaining agreement has been eliminated by the Court's opinion. In addition the
Supreme Court has dispelled the notion that a strike may occur at any time
during a collective bargaining agreement as long as sixty-days notice is given.
These two aspects of the decision have provided a much needed clarification
of the meaning of section 8(d)(4).
Surrogate's Court - Jurisdiction over Independent Contract Action for
Specific Performance.--Petitioners, in an action to compel specific performance
of a contract and payment for services rendered, alleged that the decedent
orally offered to devise and bequeath to petitioners her home and household
furnishings, in consideration for their services. Decedent by her last will devised
the property to her niece and nephew in alleged violation of the agreement.
The surrogate's court granted a motion to dismiss the specific performance
claim as to the personal property but denied it as to the real property. On
an appeal by the executor, held, reversed, and the proceeding, so far as it
sought specific performance of the alleged oral contract, dismissed. The Surrogate's Court is without jurisdiction to entertain an independent equity proceeding. In re Venblow's Estate, 2 A.D.2d 365, 156 N.Y.S.2d 267 (4th Dep't
1956).
Organized and created by constitutional provision,' the Surrogate's Court
possesses only that jurisdiction conferred upon it by the legislature, together
with such incidental powers as may be necessary to the proper exercise of its
statutory jurisdiction 2 The legislative trend, however, has been towards enlarg26. 352 U.S. at 303 (concurring opinion).
27. See note 14 supra.
28. 352 US. at 303 (concurring opinion).
29. Ibid.
1. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13 (1S94).
2. Matter of Runk, 200 N.Y. 447, 94 N.E. 363 (1911); Matter of Bolton, 159 N.Y. 129,
134, 53 N.E. 756, 757 (1899).
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ing its jurisdiction. Section 40 of the Surrogate's Court Act, as amended in
1921, expressly provides the surrogate's court with jurisdiction to administer
justice in all matters relating to the affairs of decedents and to determine all
legal or equitable questions arising between the parties to any proceeding, as to
all matters necessary to be determined in order to make a full, equitable and
complete disposition of the matter. Following this broad grant of jurisdiction
are ten specific grants of jurisdiction. A literal interpretation of this statute
suggests that the surrogate's court has jurisdiction over the instant case.
Prior to the adoption of section 40 a petition based upon a general request
for equitable consideration would have been denied, since the courts have made
it clear that this court possessed no general equity jurisdiction.3 However, it
is generally admitted that, so far at least as the estates of decedents are concerned, the court's equity jurisdiction has been greatly extended. 4 Nevertheless,
there seems to be no authority for bringing a simple "specific performance
proceeding" into a surrogate's court. Matter of Dawkins5 was the only case
that allowed such a proceeding, but the jurisdictional question was not raised
and the case, therefore, is not authority for a jurisdictional proposition.
The majority of the courts have, in effect, declared that the broad powers of
the surrogate, relative to matters affecting estates of decedents, are subject to
the ten specific grants of jurisdiction enumerated in section 40. This has been
done in spite of the fact that they are stated to be "in addition to and without
limitation or restriction on the foregoing powers. . ...o For example, in

Matter of Lakner7 the court denied application in an independent proceeding
to enforce a lien against real estate held under a testamentary trust and pointed
out that the general powers of the court can only be exercised in one of the
particular cases authorized by the legislature. Similarly, it .has been held that
the surrogate's court has no power to adjudicate ownership or possession of
realty in an independent proceeding for that purpose. 8 In Raymond v. Davis,)
it was held that, ancillary to the trial of a claim against the estate of a deceased
partner, the surrogate could order the liquidation of partnership assets. Judge
Cardozo, speaking for the court, stated: "An amendment in 1921 emphasizes the
call for a liberal construction. .

.

.The amendment gives notice that the powers

that are specific shall hereafter be read as being 'in addition to and without
limitation or restriction on' the powers that are general."'1 However, as the
court points out in the instant case, the relief granted here was as an "incident"
to the allowance or rejection of a claim to share as creditor in the assets of the
estate. Thus, in order to exercise the power to determine generally all matters,
both legal and equitable, necessary to the settlement of the decedent's estate,
the question must arise in a proceeding of which the Surrogate's Court can
3. Matter of Hasbrouck, 153 App. Div. 394, 138 N.Y. Supp. 620 (2d Dep't 1912).
4. Matter of Proctor, 157 Misc. 706, 710, 284 N.Y. Supp. 675, 680 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
5. 201 Misc. 451, 112 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
6. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 40.
7. 143 Misc. 117, 255 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
8. Kollhopp's Estate, 142 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
9. 248 N.Y. 67, 161 N.E. 421 (1928).
10. Id. at 72, 161 N.E. at 423.
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take cognizance." An independent action to compel specific performance of a
contract to devise real property is not within one of the specific grants of
jurisdiction enumerated in section 40.
Proceedings involving real property are often brought under section 227 of
the Surrogate's Court Act. It provides in part that if a person dies seized of real
property after he has made a contract to convey or sell it, a petition, praying
for the confirmation of such conveyance or for a decree that the same be
delivered, may be filed. However, there seems to be no authority for the
proposition that an oral contract to devise is a contract to convey or a contract
to sell within the meaning of the statute. In a case-' somewhat analogous to the
instant case, the court said that the surrogate may determine the validity, construction and effect of the testator's contract to devise his farm to his son. There
the testator agreed to devise real property to his son in his will in consideration
of $50 per month till death. The son petitioned for a determination of the
contract and to vest title in him. The court based its jurisdiction, in part, on
sections 40 and 227 of the Surrogate's Court Act. However, it must be noted
that the relief sought in this case was brought in conjunction with a probate
proceeding before the court, again one of the specific instances where jurisdiction is allowed under section 40.
In the instant case the court well recognizes the broad powers bestowed upon
the surrogate's court by the legislature. It denies that the court is transformed
into one with general equity jurisdiction. It finds it difficult to believe that the
legislature ever intended the court to have direct jurisdiction of every proceeding known to equity, such as rescission, reformation, foreclosure, injunction,
specific performance, etc. Such a construction, the court points out, would
work a revolution in Surrogate's practice, and the intention to accomplish that
result should be expressed in very clear language.
The ruling of the court is not harsh, but rather becomes somewhat moot
when considered with the fact that the surrogate's court has jurisdiction over
an accounting proceeding. 13 Once this jurisdiction is invoked, then the wide
equity powers of the court may be exercised. It has been held that the surrogate, as an incident to the issues in an accounting proceeding, has complete
jurisdiction to determine ownership of real property and, if necessary, to impress
a trust thereon.14 Thus, it would seem that in such a proceeding, the nature
and effect of the present oral agreement could be determined, and if it were
found that the petitioner equitably owned the property by reason of the contract, the court could direct the executor to distribute it accordingly. Furthermore, it is well established that when a surrogate's court, with its limited
jurisdiction, is unable to contend with special circumstances, the New York
Supreme Court will entertain jurisdiction and avoid a failure of remedy or a
miscarriage of justice. 1'
11. See 1 Warren's Heaton, Surrogates' Courts § 36 (6th ed. 1940).
12. Matter of Wentworth, 185 AMisc. 174, 67 N.Y.S.2d $S4 (Surr. CL 1947).
13. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 40.
14. Feit v. Schwartz, S3 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 194S).
15. Bankers Surety Co. v. Mrever, 205 N.Y. 219, 98 N.E. 399 (1912).
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Torts - Domestic Relations - Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium.
-An action by a wife for damages for loss of consortium allegedly due to the
defendant's negligent injury of her husband was dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa, held, four justices
dissenting, reversed. A wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium against
one who by his negligence has permanently incapacitated her husband. Acuff
v. Schmit,
Iowa
, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956).
Consortium at common law was the exclusive right of a husband to the
service, companionship, and conjugal affection of his wife.' A husband had a
cause of action predicated on the loss of service against one who intentionally 2
or negligently3 destroyed or impaired his consortium.
Common law refused the wife a corresponding cause of action. 4 Her legal
personality was deemed to be merged with that of her husband.0 As an individual a married woman had no capacity to contract; 0 she could transfer
neither realty nor personalty; 7 she could neither sue nor be sued.8 The removal of these disabilities in the late 19th century by a series of legislative
enactments commonly known as the Married Women's Acts raised the problem as to whether or not the wife could then maintain an action for loss of
consortium.
Practically every jurisdiction in the United States gave the wife a cause of
action when her loss was occasioned by the defendant's intentional wrongdoing, but denied her any remedy when the loss of consortium resulted from
the defendant's negligence. 10 The cases generally fall into four groups.
The first is represented by Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 11 in which the court
reasoned that there were two aspects to consortium, the "sentimental" and the
((practical"; that the sentimental embraced the right to companionship and con1.
2.

26 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife §§ 6, 9 (1940).
8 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 429-30 (1926).

At least for the purpose of

affording the husband a cause of action the status of a wife was equated to that of a
servant. Both were considered chattels. As the master had a cause of action against one
who interfered with his right to the service of his servant so also did the husband have
a cause of action against one who interfered with his right of consortium. See Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 651 (1930).
3.

2 Jones, Blackstone 1684, n.17 (1916).

4. Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Kosciolek
v. Portland Ry. Light & Power Co., 81 Ore. 517, 160 Pac. 132 (1916).
5. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Heacock v. Heacock, 108 Iowa 540,
79 N.W. 353 (1899); Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
6. Ankeney v. Hannon, 147 U.S. 118 (1872); Snell v. Snell, 123 Ill.
403, 14 N.E. 684
(1888); Clowes v. Vanderheyden, 17 Johns. 167 (N.Y. 1819).

7. 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 196 (1944).
8. Bank of America v. Banks, 101 U.S. 240 (1879); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61,
100 So. 591 (1924); Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W. 1035 (1911).

9. 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife §§ 522, 535 (1940).

The most common actions

in this category were alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
10. 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife § 514 (1940).
11.

84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911).
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jugal affection; and the predominant element of the practical was the right to
material services. When an intentional wrongdoer caused a loss of consortium
by alienating a spouse's affections or by an act of criminal conversation the
court reasoned that the elements of the sentimental version were damaged, but
when the loss was occasioned by a personal injury negligently inflicted, damage
was limited to the loss of material services.- The court therefore held that the
cause of action for the loss of consortium when occasioned by negligence was
abolished when the Emancipation Acts abolished the husband's right to the
rendition of material services by the wife. Since the wife's status was now equated with that of her husband both spouses were denied relief for loss of consortium caused by the defendant's negligence. 13
A second group of cases holding that service is the only actionable element
of consortium deny relief to the wife on the ground that recovery by her would
constitute a double recovery for the same wrong. 14 These courts reason that
the husband's sole obligation to the wife is one of support; that in the event
that the husband is unable to fulfill this obligation he will be adequately compensated in his own action; and that such compensation will therefore at least
indirectly accrue to the wife. Some of these courts permit a recovery by the
husband in a similar action on the ground that there is no similar duty owing to him by his wife and therefore compensation for his loss of consortium
would not constitute a double recovery.'1
In a third group of cases the courts deny the wife recovery although they
concede an injury to the sentimental aspect of consortium. Among the reasons
given is that the damage is too remote and consequential to be capable of
measure;' 0 that it is indirect;' T that the wife had no such cause of action
at common law and that the Married Women's Acts did not create one; 18
and that the only actionable element in the loss of consortium is still the loss
of material service.' 9
12. The court distinguished the act of intentionally interfering with consortium by
alienation of affections or criminal conversation from a negligent act which causes personal injury. The court reasoned that the former is by its very nature destructive of
consortium whereas the latter is not. Although a personal injury may incapacitate a

spouse, such was not the intent of the tortfeasor, and to a certain extent the remaining
elements of consortium, e.g., companionship and society, remain intact.
13. Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 1S7, 236 N.V. 222 (1931); Heinteller v. Dule

Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E2d 611 (1945). Contra, Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc.,
205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933).

14. Feneff v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1009); Nash v.
Mobile & 0. R.R, 149 Miss. S23, 116 So. 100 (1928); Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612,
203 S.W. 462 (1913).
15. Nash v. Mobile & 0. R.R.I, 149 Miss. 323, 116 So. 10D (1928); Bernhardt v. Perry,
276 Mo. 612, 20S S.W. 462 (1913).

16. Kosciolek v. Portland Ry. Light & Power Co., 31 Ore. 517, 160 Pac. 132 (1916).
17. Stout v. Karsa City Term. Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913).
18. Ibid.
19. Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933).
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Finally there is the view represented in New York by Goldman v. Cohen20
that the wife's "... interest in the husband's life and companionship is not
a right of property, or derived from a contract of bargain and sale. That interest lies in a region into which the law does not enter except when necessity
'21
compels."
In 1950 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected the foregoing arguments and held in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. 22 that
a wife had a cause of action for loss of consortium occasioned by the defendant's
negligence. In the opinion of the court consortium, "... although it embraces
within its ambit of meaning the wife's material services, also includes love,
affection, companionship, sexual relations, etc., all welded into a conceptualistic unity.123 The court held that the element of service was a mere fiction
of common law pleading and not requisite for a cause of action; and that this
is manifest from consortium actions for intentional torts in which there has
been no loss of service at all. The court argued that the distinction between
intentional and negligent tort actions suggested by the Marn decision is not
only illogical, but unprecedented as well. If a husbafid has a cause of action
for the loss of consortium so also should the wife. If a wife has a cause of
action when the loss is the result of an intentional tort she should have a similar remedy in a negligence action. In both instances the right to be protected
is the same. Furthermore, the court reasoned, the mere fact that the husband's
award will compensate for his inability to support his wife is not a valid
reason for denying the wife's action. The amount of such compensation should
be considered and excluded in determining to what extent she has been injured, but this recovery does not compensate her for the loss of her husband's
society and conjugal affection. It is possible to injure one, two or all the elements which the term consortium embraces and compensation should be made
24
accordingly.
In Price v. Price,25 an early Iowa decision, the court adopted what has come
to be known as the sentimental version of consortium. In the same decision
it also stated that consortium was a valuable property right to both husband
and wife. In the instant case the majority followed the reasoning of the
Price and Hitaffer decisions.
The reasoning of the instant case is sound. Once it has been determined
that the consortium of a husband is a valuable property right of the wife, then
whether the tortfeasor intended injury to it should be of no consequence. In
either instance one or more of the elements that make up the concept has been
20.

30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1900).

21. Id. at 337, 63 N.Y. Supp. at 459.
22. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
23. Id. at 814.
24. But see Don v. Benjamin M. Knapp, Inc., 281 App. Div. 892, 119 N.Y.S.2d 800
(2d Dep't 1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 675, 117 N.E.2d 128 (1954), where it was held that the
complaint of a wife for loss of services and consortium resulting from injuries to her husband, allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence, failed to state a cause of action.
25.

91 Iowa 693, 60 N.W. 202 (1894).
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lost and the degree of loss is not diminished by the tortfeasor's specific intent.
In the instant case the Iowa court has held that the loss of the wife is sufficiently proximate to be compensable. Although this may be a subject of dispute
in jurisdictions where different theories of proximate cause apply, certainly
wherever it is held that a negligent injury to a wife is sufficiently proximate to
the husband's loss of consortium to be compensable, reason should demand a
corresponding finding of proximity when the husband is negligently injured.
Torts - Libel and Slander - Broadcasting of Unwritten Defamation as
Libel.--Plaintiff brought an action alleging defamation by defendant while the
latter was conducting an informal televised interview. Upon defendant's motion
to dismiss for insufficiency, held, denied. Publication of unwritten defamation
through medium of television is libel and not slander. Skor v. Billingsley,
Misc. 2d
,158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
The law of defamation as it is known today consists of the two torts of libel
and slander. The latter has evolved from the ecclesiastical courts of England
where defamatory utterances were treated as spiritual rather than civil wrongs.1
When the civil courts obtained jurisdiction over slander, the plaintiff was
required to show temporal or actual damages in order to recover. 2 This is still
the rule today with the exception of statements which are slanderous per se.3
Libel, on the other hand, developed from the criminal action for written
defamation which had its inception in the beginning of the seventeenth century
in the Court of the Star Chamber in England.4 Since then the courts have
denominated as libel any defamation which is embodied in some more or less
permanent physical form.
This test of permanence caused no serious difficulties in distinguishing libel
from slander until the courts were faced with defamatory statements broadcast
over the air.6 Even then the problem was at least partially resolved in cases
where the defamatory remarks were read from a prepared script since the
element of permanence of form could be found in the script.7 But as to those
statements made extemporaneously over the air, the law is not settled and in
this regard three views have been expressed.
First there is the view expressed in Locke v. GibbonsS where it was held that
1. Prosser, Torts § 92 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Ibid.
3. Id. at § 93.
4. Remington v. Bentley, SS F. Supp. 166, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also Donnelly, Hitory
of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 99, 117.
5. Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 301, 73 N.E.2d 30, 32 (1947); Ostroe v. LIM,
256 N.Y. 36, 39, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931).
6. Apparently the courts do not make a distinction betw.een defamatory statements made
over radio and those made over television.
7. Hartmnn v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947); Sorenson v. Wood, 123
Neb. 34, 353, 243 N.W. 82, 85 (1932).
8. 164 M,1isc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 1SS (Sup CL 1937), afi'd, 253 App. Div. 837, 2 N.Y.S2d
1015 (1st Dep't 1938).
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defamatory interpolations to a prepared script sound in slander and not libel.9

The court reasoned that if one is to distinguish between libel and slander, consideration must be given to permanence of form as well as mischief. 10 Without

the former, an essential element is lacking and consequently the defamatory
remark cannot be libel. To support this reasoning, the court drew an analogy
between an extemporaneous speech delivered at a crowded stadium and one
delivered over the air to a radio audience;" that is, since the speech at the
stadium is obviously slander the same principle of law should be equally applicable to statements made over the air.
The second view is that of Pennsylvania,'1 2 which standing alone, 13 takes
the position that neither the established principles of libel nor slander should
be applied to a defamation transmitted
over the air, but rather such defamation
14
should be treated as a new tort.
The third view is that extemporaneous defamatory remarks made over the
air are libel. This is the position which was strongly urged by Judge Fuld in
his concurring opinion in Hartmann v. Winchell'5 and which is expressed by

many writers on the subject as the better view.16
The rationale of this position is that damage to the defamed person is the
essential element which forms the basis for an action in defamation. The

broader liability attached to libel was imposed because of its greater capacity to
harm consequent upon its permanence of form. Thus, even though a defamation
made over the air is not reduced to some permanent form, "when account is
taken of the vast and far-flung audience reached by radio, it is clear that the
biroadcast of defamatory utterances are as potentially harmful to the defamed
person's reputation as a publication by writing. Radio makes available to the

defamer a simultaneous 17audience far greater than that reached by the most

permanent of writings.'

9. 164 Misc. 877, 881, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188, 193. This same view was adopted by the
federal courts in Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
10. 164 Misc. 877, 880, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188, 192.
11. Ibid.
12. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 200, 8 A.2d 302, 310
(1939). This court said: "A rule should be applied which will not impose too heavy a burden
on the (radio) industry and yet will secure a high measure of protection to the public or
those who may be injured."
13. In Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948), the court indicated it might
follow this view.
14. See Donnelly, Defamation by Radio, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 12, 16-17 (1948); Newhouse,
Defamation by Radio: A New Tort, 17 Ore. L. Rev. 314 (1938).
15. 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947). In this case the defamatory statements were
read from a prepared script and the majority, while calling such statements libel, refused
to speculate as to whether such statements would be libel if they were extemporaneously
made.
16. Seelman, Libel and Slander § 7 (1933) ; Restatement, Torts § 568(3), comments f,g
(1938); Donnelly, Defamation by Radio, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 12, 16-17 (1948); Vold, Basis for
Liability for Defamation by Radio, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 611, 639-44 (1935). Contra, Sprague,
Freedom of the Air, 8 Air L. Rev. 30 (1937).
17. Donnelly, Defamation by Radio, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 12, 18 (1948).
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In the instant case the court relied heavily on Judge Fuld's reasoning in
arriving at its decision. However, before the defamatory statements in question
could be denominated libel the court had to show that the Appellate Division's
affirmance of Locke v. Gibbons,"' even though in the same judicial department as
the instant case, was not controlling here. In the Gibbons case the court dismissed
the complaint on two grounds.' 9 The affirmance by the Appellate Division was
without opinion but it did refer to another of its decisions wherein Locke's
identical cause of action against another defendant was dismissed solely on the
ground that the complaint failed to set out the defamatory words. "Under
these circumstances, the affirmance without opinion does not necessarily indicate approval of the reasoning. .. ." in the Gibbons case.2
Thus in New York there are now two contrary views on this subject and the
problem remains unsettled. The basis for this divergence lies in the concept of
libel. One view maintains that permanence of form is an essential element of
the tort without which a defamation is not libel. It is submitted that the newer
view is apparently the better one; it minimizes permanence of form and
emphasizes the potential harm stemming from a defamation capable of unlimited publication, regardless of whether it is spoken extemporaneously or read
from a prepared script.

Torts - Libel and Slander - Fair Comment - Libel Per Se.-Plaintiff
brought an action for libel based on the publication of his name in the book
"Red Channels." He was named as having been active in one meeting and as
having attended another meeting of organizations characterized as communist
fronts. Plaintiff admitted the truth of these statements. In a preface to the
list in which plaintiff's name appeared defendant indicated that some of the
persons listed were Communists and others were innocently inveigled into participating in these activities. As a consequence of these activities, the writer
commented, the public was gravely injured and the men named were disqualified
from working on radio and television. The trial court dismissed the complaint
on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove at least prima facie that libel was
published of and concerning him. The appellate division unanimously affirmed.
Upon appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, two judges dissenting,
affirmed. Assuming the comments were published of and concerning the plaintiff, they were fair e-xpressions of opinion based on true facts in a matter of
extreme public interest. The court also held, affirming the reasoning of the
courts below, that plaintiff failed to prove that the alleged libel was connected
to him. Julian v. American Business Consultants,Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d
1 (1956).
18. 253 App. Div. SS7, 2 N.YS.2d 1015 (lst Dep't 193S).
19. The court found that the extemporaneous interpolations were slander and, secondly,
that the complaint was defective in that it failed to allege the exact defamatory words claimed
to have been used by the defendant.
20. Locke v. Benton & Bowles, Inc, 253 App. Div. 369, 2 N.Y.S.2d 150 (Ist Dep't 1933).
21. Shor v. Billingsley,
Misc. 2d
,
, 158 N.YS2d 476, 4E0 (Sup. CL 1956).
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Fair comment may be defined as an honest expression of opinion, made with-

out malice, based on facts truly stated, concerning a matter of public interest.1
Although the definition may be easily stated, its meaning, application, and
significance present many problems. Initially there is a conflict of opinion as

to the basic nature of the defense. The majority of jurisdictions hold that it is
a defamatory statement which is privileged, while the reasoning of the minority
is that the publication is not defamatory since it is based on the right of
freedom to criticize for the public good. 2 Under either theory, however, the
result is the same.
First, the matter must be public; no one has the right to publicly criticize
private acts. "In all cases, in short, the existence and the extent of the privilege
is determined by balancing the needs of society with the right of an individual
to enjoy a good reputation when he has done nothing which ought to injure it."3
Criticism of private acts helps society little, if at all, and may irreparably harm
the individual.
when the
Secondly, the facts in the publication must be true, 4 since "...
facts are truthfully stated, comment thereon, if unjust, will fall harmless, for
the former furnish a ready antidote for the latter."r' Before judging the facts
it is of vital importance to determine what is expressed as fact and what is
expressed as opinion in the publication since the facts must be true, whereas
1. This definition may be culled from the leading New York cases on the subject. "A
comment is fair when it is based on facts truly stated. . . ." Briarcliff Lodge Hotel Inc.,
v. C. S. Publishers, Inc., 260 N.Y. 106, 118, 183 N.E. 193, 198 (1932) ; "Criticism as to matters
of public interest and concern is privileged so long as the criticism is fair with an honest
purpose and not intemperate and malicious." Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 263 App, Div.
403, 412, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840, 849 (3d Dep't 1942) ; "It suffices that a reasonable man may honestly
entertain such opinion on the facts found by the jury to be true, that the writer did so entertain
it and expressed it without malice." Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 547,
235 N.Y. Supp. 340, 354 (1st Dep't 1929).
2. In Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App. Div. at 548, 235 N.Y. Supp. at 355, the
court stated, "It is important to emphasize that this defense is not one of privilege." However,
in Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 263 App. Div. at 412, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 849, the court
called it a "protecting privilege"; Seelman, Libel and Slander 236 (1933) maintains that
it should be termed a right.
3. Van Vechten Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1910).
4. Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911) held that the writer makes
statements of fact at his peril. ". . . [Tihe defense of fair comment requires that the facts
be truly stated." Foltz v. News Syndicate Co., 114 F. Supp. 599, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). "The
only requirement seems to be that the facts upon which the opinion is based must be stated
or else readily available to the persons to whom the comment is addressed; and the comment
may not be so completely unrelated to the facts upon which it is made that it may be taken
to imply the existence of other undisclosed facts." Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and
Candidates, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 875, 880-81 (1949). A distinct minority view would extend
the immunity to misstatements of fact ". . . regarding the public conduct and views of public
officials, so long as no charge of crime, corruption, gross immorality or gross incompetence
is made and no special damage results." See Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942).

5. Van Vechten Veeder, op. cit. supra note 3, at 420.
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the opinion need only be fair. If the comment by implication introduces unstated facts it becomes a communication of fact and not criticism and the test
of truth will be brought to bear on the defendant. 7 One test in making this
distinction is

"...

whether ordinary persons hearing or reading the matter

complained of would be likely to understand it as an expression of the -peaker's
or writer's opinion, or as a statement of existing fact."8

Finally the statement must be the fair opinion of the writer, that is, made
without malice.0 Thus fairness is to be judged by the state of mind of the
defendant when he published the comment, and not by the objective truth of
the comment. "It seems clear that the jury is not to substitute its judgment
on the matter in the controversy for that of the defendant, and exclude from the
immunity of 'fair' comment all criticism with which it disagrees."10
In the instant case the court decided that the matter was of grave public
importance, noting the pervading influence of radio and television in American
life. The defendant admitted the truth of the facts upon which the comment
was based. When the expressions of opinion in this case are tested by the
definition of fair comment, the first one-that the public was gravely injured
by plaintiff's activities-seems clearly to be within the scope of the definition.
It is closely related to the admitted facts and as the court says, seems "ineluctable." In finding that the second comment-that plaintiff was disqualified
from working on radio and television-was also fair comment the court stated
as a matter of law that this was an assertion of opinion, not a statement of fact,
which was reasonable and concerning which plaintiff failed to prove actual
malice; therefore it was fair.
Furthermore, the court maintained that the plaintiff failed to prove that
libel was published of and concerning him. To determine this question the
publication must be read as a whole. "A sentence or phrase may not be seized
upon and detached from its context to support an action for libel, if the publication as a whole is not, in fact, defamatory."" Reading the whole publication the judge must decide if the alleged defamation refers to the plaintiff. The
New York cases on the subject give no more specific rule.' This court decided
that the qualification expressed in the preface-that some were innocent and
some were Communist sympathizers-protected the defendant sufficiently in
the absence of proof that he was intended to be listed as a communist sympathizer. The holding is based squarely on Hays v. Aincrican Defense Soc'y
6. 1 Harper and James, Torts § 5.2S (1956).
7. "If the imputations are thus inferable and honestly stated, the publication is justified.
Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App. Div. at 547, 235 N.Y. Supp. at 354. "The defense of

fair comment is not available to one who makes ... unjustifiable inferences.? Toomey
v. Farley, 2 N.Y.2d 71, 78, 138 N.E.2d 221, 225 (1956). See alo Bingbam v. Gaynor, 203
N.Y. 27, 32, 96 N.E. 84, 85 (1911).
8. 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 6.
9. See also Van Vechten Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 413,414;
1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 6; Prosser, Torts § 95 (1955).
10. 1 Harper and James, op. cit supra note 6, § 5.28.
11. Dressler v. Mayer, 22 N.J. Super. 129, 135 (App. Div. 1952).
12. See Seelman, Libel and Slander 421-23 (1933), for a discussion of the cases.
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Inc.,13 which involved a political pamphlet in which it was stated that the
plaintiff was a member of a committee whose activities aided the communist
party. It was also stated that many of these members were motivated by
humanitarian impulses and had no appreciation of where they were going.
Nowhere was plaintiff called a "Red." The court held that a fair reading of the
pamphlet would not disclose that plaintiff was a knowing worker for the Communists. Although the dissent argued that the reasonableness of the second statement was a question for the jury in the instant case, both the majority and the
dissent agreed that the statement must be reasonably related to the stated facts
in order to be considered comment. The majority held that there was in fact
such a reasonable relation as a matter of law stating that, ". . . the courts may
not construct a shelter from comment for those persons who lend their prestige
and presence to groups or persons believed to be working against the national
interest."' 4 While this statement of the majority is obviously true, it sheds no
light on the initial problem of determining whether or not the statement in
question is in fact a comment. Since it would not be unreasonable to conclude
that the statement in question inferred new facts, it would therefore seem, as the
dissent pointed out, that a question was raised for the jury.
13.

252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929).

14.

Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 137 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1956).

